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Abstract—Applying deductive verification to formally prove
that a program respects its formal specification is a very complex
and time-consuming task due in particular to the lack of feedback
in case of proof failures. Along with a non-compliance between
the code and its specification (due to an error in at least one of
them), possible reasons of a proof failure include a missing or too
weak specification for a called function or a loop, and lack of time
or simply incapacity of the prover to finish a particular proof.
This work proposes a new methodology where test generation
helps to identify the reason of a proof failure and to exhibit a
counter-example clearly illustrating the issue. We describe how
to transform an annotated C program into C code suitable for
testing and illustrate the benefits of the method on comprehensive
examples. The method has been implemented in STADY, a plugin
of the software analysis platform FRAMA-C. Initial experiments
show that detecting non-compliances and contract weaknesses
allows to precisely diagnose most proof failures.
Keywords: deductive verification, test generation, specifica-
tion, proof failure, non-compliance detection, contract weakness
detection, Frama-C
I. INTRODUCTION
Among formal verification techniques, deductive verifica-
tion consists in establishing a rigorous mathematical proof that
a given program meets its specification. When no confusion
is possible, one also says that deductive verification consists
in “proving a program”. It requires that the program comes
with a formal specification, usually given in special comments
called annotations, including function contracts (with pre- and
postconditions) and loop contracts (with loop variants and
invariants). The weakest precondition calculus proposed by
Dijkstra [1] reduces any deductive verification problem to es-
tablishing the validity of first-order formulas called verification
conditions.
In modular deductive verification of a function f calling
another function g, the roles of the pre- and postconditions
of f and of the callee g are dual. The precondition of f is
assumed and its postcondition must be proved, while at any
call of g in f , the precondition of g must be proved before
the call and its postcondition is assumed after the call. The
situation for a function f with one call to g is presented in
Fig. 1a. An arrow in this figure informally indicates that its
initial point provides a hypothesis for a proof of its final point.
For instance, the precondition Pref of f and the postcondition
Postg of g provide hypotheses for a proof of the postcondition
Postf of f . The called function g is proved separately. The
verification of the loop invariant I of a loop in f is illustrated
by Fig. 1b: I must be proved to hold initially before the first
loop iteration, and I ∧ ¬b is assumed after exiting the loop.
In addition, the preservation of the loop invariant I by each
unique iteration of the loop must be established during the
proof of f . (Loop termination, not illustrated in Fig. 1b, can
be proved as well.)
// Pref assumed
f(<args>){
code1;
// Preg to be proved
g(<args>);
// Postg assumed
code2;
}
// Postf to be proved
(a) called function g
// Pref assumed
f(<args>){
code1;
// I to be proved
while(b){
// I ∧ b assumed
code3;
// I to be proved
}
// I ∧ ¬b assumed
code2;
}
// Postf to be proved
(b) loop
Fig. 1: Verification of a function
f with a callee or a loop
To reflect the fact that
some contracts become
hypotheses during deduc-
tive verification of f we
use the term subcontracts
for f to designate con-
tracts of called functions
and loops in f .
Motivation. One of
the most important diffi-
culties in deductive ver-
ification is the manual
processing of proof fail-
ures by the verification
engineer since proof fail-
ures may have several
causes. Indeed, a failure
to prove Preg in Fig. 1a
may be due to a non-
compliance of the code to
the specification: an error
in the code code1, or a
wrong specification Pref
or Preg itself that may
incorrectly formalize the
requirements. The verifi-
cation can also remain in-
conclusive because of a
prover incapacity to fin-
ish a particular proof within an allocated time. In many cases,
it is extremely difficult for the verification engineer to decide
how to proceed: either suspect a non-compliance and look for
an error in the code or check the specification, or suspect a
prover incapacity, give up automatic proof and try to achieve
an interactive proof with a proof assistant (like COQ [2]).
A failure to prove the postcondition Postf (cf. Fig. 1a) is
even more complex to analyze: along with a prover incapacity
or a non-compliance due to errors in the pieces of code code1
and code2 or an incorrect specification Pref or Postf , the
failure can also result from a too weak postcondition Postg
of g, that does not fully express the intended behavior of
g. Notice that in this last case, the proof of g can still be
successful. The current automated tools for program proving
do not provide a precise indication on the reason of the proof
failure. The most advanced tools (like DAFNY [3]) produce a
counter-example extracted from the underlying solver without
saying directly if the verification engineer should look for a
non-compliance, or strengthen subcontracts (and which one
of them), or consider adding additional lemmas or using
interactive proof. So the verification engineer must basically
consider all possible reasons one after another, maybe also
trying a very costly interactive proof. For a loop, the situation
is similar and offers an additional challenge: to prove the
invariant preservation, whose failure can be due to several
reasons as well.
The motivation of this work is twofold. First, we want to
provide the verification engineer with a more precise feedback
indicating the reason of each proof failure. Second, we look
for a counter-example that either confirms the non-compliance
and demonstrates that the unproven predicate can indeed fail
on a test datum, or confirms a subcontract weakness showing
on a test datum which subcontract is insufficient.
Approach and goals. We propose to use advanced test gen-
eration techniques in order to diagnose a proof failure and pro-
duce counter-examples. Their usage requires a translation of
the annotated C program into an executable C code suitable for
testing. Previous works addressed the generation of counter-
examples only for non-compliance [4] and proposed a rule-
based formalization of annotation translation in that case [5].
The cases of subcontract weakness remained undetected and
indistinguishable from a prover incapacity. The overall goal
of the present work is to provide a methodology for a more
precise identification of proof failure reasons in all these cases,
to implement it and to evaluate it in practice. The proposed
method is composed of two steps. The first step looks for non-
compliance. If no non-compliance is detected, the second step
looks for a subcontract weakness. Another goal is to make this
method automatic and suitable for a non-expert verification
engineer. Following the modular verification approach, we
assume that the called functions respect their contracts. To
simplify the presentation, we also assume that the loops
preserve their loop invariants, and focus on other proof failures
occurring during modular verification of f . (The proposed
detection techniques can be adapted to the verification of a
loop contract.)
The contributions of this paper include:
• a classification of proof failures into three categories:
non-compliance, subcontract weakness and prover in-
capacity,
• a definition of counter-examples for the first two
categories,
• a new program transformation technique for the di-
agnosis of a subcontract weakness by testing (in
addition to the one previously proposed for non-
compliance [5]),
• a complete testing-based methodology for diagnosis
of proof failures and generation of counter-examples,
suggesting possible actions for each category, illus-
trated on several comprehensive examples,
• an implementation of the proposed solution in a tool
called STADY, and
• experiments showing its capacity of diagnosis of proof
failures.
Paper outline. Sections II and III respectively present the
tools used in this work and an illustrative example. Section IV
defines the categories of proof failures and counter-examples,
and presents program transformations for their identification.
The complete methodology for the diagnosis of proof failures
is presented in Section V. Our implementation and experiments
are described in Sec. VI. Finally, Sections VII and VIII present
some related works and a conclusion.
II. FRAMA-C TOOLSET
This work is realized in the context of the FRAMA-C
toolset. FRAMA-C [6] is a platform dedicated to analysis of
C programs that includes various source code analyzers in
separate plugins. The VALUE plugin performs value analysis
by abstract interpretation. The WP plugin performs weakest
precondition calculus for deductive verification of C programs.
Several automatic SMT solvers can be used to prove the
verification conditions generated by WP. In this work we use
ALT-ERGO 0.99.1 and CVC3 2.4.1. FRAMA-C also includes
plugins for control-flow and program dependency graph con-
struction, program slicing, impact analysis, test generation, etc.
To express properties over C programs, FRAMA-C offers a
behavioral specification language named ACSL [7], [6]. ACSL
annotations play a central role in communication between
plugins: any analyzer can both add annotations to be verified
by other ones and notify other plugins about its own analysis
results by changing an annotation status. The status can
indicate that the annotation is valid, valid under conditions,
invalid or undetermined, and which analyzer established that
result.
For combinations with dynamic analysis, FRAMA-C also
supports E-ACSL [8], [9], a rich executable subset of ACSL suit-
able for runtime assertion checking. E-ACSL can express func-
tion contracts (pre/postconditions, guarded behaviors, com-
pleteness and disjointness of behaviors), assertions and loop
contracts (variants and invariants). It supports quantifications
over bounded intervals of integers, mathematical integers and
memory-related constructs (e.g. on validity and initialization).
It comes with an instrumentation-based translating plugin,
called E-ACSL2C, that translates annotations into additional
C code in order to evaluate annotations at runtime and report
failures. Important differences between a translation for run-
time assertion checking and a translation for test generation
(e.g. to support unbounded integer arithmetics in E-ACSL and
some specific annotations) [5] make E-ACSL2C inadequate for
our work and create the need for a dedicated translation tool.
For test generation, this work relies on PATHCRAW-
LER [10], a Dynamic Symbolic Execution testing tool, com-
bining concrete and symbolic execution. PATHCRAWLER is
based on a specific constraint solver, COLIBRI, that imple-
ments advanced features such as floating-point and modular
integer arithmetics support. PATHCRAWLER provides coverage
strategies like k-path (feasible paths with at most k consecu-
tive loop iterations) and all-paths (all feasible paths without
any limitation on loop iterations). PATHCRAWLER is sound,
meaning that each test case activates the test objective for
which it was generated. This is verified by concrete execution.
PATHCRAWLER is also complete in the following sense: when
1 /*@ predicate is_rgf(int *a, Z n) =
2 a[0] == 0 ∧ ∀ Z i; 1 ≤ i < n⇒ (0 ≤ a[i] ≤ a[i-1]+1); */
3
4 /*@ lemma max_rgf: ∀ int* a; ∀ Z n;
5 is_rgf(a, n)⇒ (∀ Z i; 0 ≤ i < n⇒ a[i] ≤ i); */
6
7 /*@ requires n > 0;
8 requires \valid(a+(0..n-1));
9 requires 1 ≤ i ≤ n-1;
10 requires is_rgf(a,i+1);
11 assigns a[i+1..n-1];
12 ensures is_rgf(a,n); */
13 void g(int a[], int n, int i) {
14 int k;
15 /*@ loop invariant i+1 ≤ k ≤ n;
16 loop invariant is_rgf(a,k);
17 loop assigns k, a[i+1..n-1];
18 loop variant n-k; */
19 for (k = i+1; k < n; k++) a[k] = 0;
20 }
21
22 /*@ requires n > 0;
23 requires \valid(a+(0..n-1));
24 requires is_rgf(a,n);
25 assigns a[1..n-1];
26 ensures is_rgf(a,n);
27 ensures \result == 1⇒
28 ∃ Z j; 0 ≤ j < n ∧
29 (\at(a[j],Pre) < a[j] ∧
30 ∀ Z k; 0 ≤ k < j⇒ \at(a[k],Pre) == a[k]); */
31 int f(int a[], int n) {
32 int i,k;
33 /*@ loop invariant 0 ≤ i ≤ n-1;
34 loop assigns i;
35 loop variant i; */
36 for (i = n-1; i ≥ 1; i--)
37 if (a[i] ≤ a[i-1]) { break; }
38 if (i == 0) { return 0; } // Last RGF.
39 //@ assert a[i]+1 ≤ 2147483647;
40 a[i] = a[i] + 1;
41 g(a,n,i);
42 /*@ assert ∀ Z l; 0 ≤ l < i ⇒ \at(a[l],Pre) == a[l]; */
43 return 1;
44 }
Fig. 2: Successor function for restricted growth functions
(RGF)
the tool manages to explore all feasible paths of the program,
all features of the program are supported by the tool and
constraint solving terminates for all paths, the absence of a
test for some test objective means that the test objective is
infeasible, since the tool does not approximate path constraints
[10, Sec. 3.1].
III. ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE
We illustrate the issues arising in deductive verification
of programs and the solutions we propose on the example
of C program of Fig. 2. It comes from an ongoing work
on formal specification and deductive verification [11] and
implements an algorithm proposed in [12, page 235]. The
example of Fig. 2 concerns the generation of Restricted Growth
Functions (RGF), defined by the property expressed by the
ACSL predicate is_rgf on lines 1–2 of Fig. 2, where the
RGF a is represented by the C array of its values. For
convenience of the reader, some ACSL notations are replaced
by mathematical symbols (e.g. keywords \exists, \forall and
integer are respectively denoted by ∃, ∀ and Z).
Fig. 2 shows a main function f and an auxiliary function g.
The precondition of f states that a is a valid array of size n>0
(lines 22–23) and must be an RGF (line 24). The postcondition
states that the function is only allowed to modify the values
of array a except the first one a[0] (line 25), and that the
generated array a is still an RGF (line 26). Moreover, if the
function returns 1 then the generated RGF a must respect an
additional property (lines 27–30). Here \at(a[j],Pre) denotes
the value of a[j] in the Pre state, i.e. before the function starts
execution.
We focus now on the body of the function f in Fig. 2.
The loop on lines 36–37 goes through the array from right
to left to find the rightmost non-increasing element, that is,
the maximal array index i such that a[i] ≤a[i-1]. If such an
index i is found, the function increments a[i] (line 40) and
fills out the rest of the array with 0’s (call to g, line 41). The
loop contract (lines 33–35) specifies the interval of values of
the loop variable, the variable that the loop can modify as well
as a loop variant that can be used to ensure the termination
of the loop. The loop variant expression must be non-negative
whenever an iteration starts, and strictly decrease after it.
The function g is used to fill the array with zeros to the
right of index i. In addition to size and validity constraints
(lines 7–8), its precondition requires that the elements of a up
to index i form an RGF (lines 9–10). The function is allowed
to modify the elements of a starting from the index i+1 (line 11)
and generates an RGF (line 12). The loop invariants indicate
the value interval of the loop variable k (line 15), and state
that the property is_rgf is satisfied up to k (line 16). This
invariant allows a deductive verification tool to deduce the
postcondition. The annotation loop assigns (line 17) says that
the only values the loop can change are k and the elements of
a starting from the index i+1. The term n-k is a variant of the
loop (line 18).
The ACSL lemma max_rgf on lines 4–5 states that if an
array is an RGF, then each of its elements is at most equal to
its index. This lemma is not proved as such by WP but can be
used to ensure the absence of overflow at line 40.
The functions of Fig. 2 can be fully proved using WP.
Suppose now this example contains one of the following four
mistakes: the verification engineer either forgets the precondi-
tion on line 24, or writes the wrong assignment a[i]=a[i]+2; on
line 40, or puts a too general clause loop assigns i,a[1..n-1];
on line 34, or forgets to provide the lemma on lines 4–5. In
each of these four cases, the proof fails (for the precondition
of g on line 41 and/or the assertion on line 39) for different
reasons. In fact, only in the first two cases the code and
specification are not compliant, while the third failure is due to
a too weak subcontract, and the last one comes from a prover
incapacity. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing
techniques allows to automatically distinguish the three reasons
and suggest suitable actions. This work proposes a complete
methodology to provide such assistance.
IV. CATEGORIES OF PROOF FAILURES AND
COUNTER-EXAMPLES
Let P be a C program annotated in E-ACSL, and f the
function under verification in P . Function f is assumed to be
recursion-free. It may call other functions, let g denote any of
them. A test datum V for f is a vector of values for all input
variables of f . The program path activated by a test datum V ,
denoted piV , is the sequence of program statements executed by
the program on the test datum V . We use the general term of a
contract to designate the set of E-ACSL annotations describing
a loop or a function. A function contract is composed of
pre- and postconditions including E-ACSL clauses requires,
assigns and ensures (cf. lines 22–30 in Fig. 2). A loop contract
is composed of loop invariant, loop variant and loop assigns
clauses (cf. lines 15–18 in Fig. 2).
Obviously, an annotation cannot be proved for all inputs if
there exist inputs for which the property does not hold. The
notion of counter-example depends on the way annotations
are evaluated. The diagnosis of proof failures based on the
prover’s counter-examples can be imprecise since from the
prover’s point of view, the code of callees and loops in f
is replaced by the corresponding subcontracts. To make this
diagnosis more precise, we propose to take into account their
code as well as their contracts, and to treat both by testing. In
this section, we define three kinds of proof failure reasons, two
kinds of counter-examples and associated detection techniques.
Sec. IV-A defines a non-compliance and briefly recalls the
detection technique previously published in [5]. Sec. IV-B is
part of the original contribution of this paper, which introduces
too new categories of proof failures and a new translation for
test generation.
A. Non-Compliance
A previous work [5] formally described how to transform
a C program P annotated in E-ACSL into an instrumented
program, denoted PNC in this paper, on which we can apply
test generation to produce test data violating some annota-
tions at runtime.1 PNC checks all annotations of P in the
corresponding program locations and reports any failure. For
instance, the postcondition Postf of f is evaluated by the
following code inserted at the end of the function f in PNC:
int post_f; Spec2Code(Postf, post_f); fassert(post_f); (†)
For an E-ACSL predicate P, we denote by Spec2Code(P, b) the
generated C code evaluating the predicate P and assigning its
validity status to the Boolean variable b (see [5] for details).
The function call fassert(b) is expanded into a conditional
statement if(b) that reports the failure and exits whenever
b is false. Similarly, preconditions and postconditions of a
callee g are evaluated respectively before and after executing
the function g. A loop invariant is checked before the loop
(for being initially true) and after each loop iteration (for
being preserved by the previous loop iteration). An assertion is
checked at its location. To generate only test data that respect
the precondition Pref of f , it is checked in the beginning of
f similarly to (†) except that fassert is replaced by fassume to
assume the given condition.
Definition 1 (Non-compliance): We say that there is a non-
compliance between code and specification in P if there exists
a test datum V for f respecting its precondition, such that PNC
reports an annotation failure on V . In this case, we say that V
is a non-compliance counter-example (NCCE).
Test generation on the translated program PNC can be
used to generate NCCEs (cf. [5]). We call this technique
Non-Compliance Detection (NCD). In this work we use the
PATHCRAWLER test generator that will try to cover all program
paths. Since the translation step has added a branch for the
1This translation is illustrated by Fig.10 in Appendix A. For simplicity, we
present it for all annotations at the same time as in [5]. Its adaptation for
a modular approach, or even to a particular annotation whose proof fails, is
straightforward.
1 /*@ assigns k1,...,kN;
2 @ ensures P; */
3 Typeg g(...){ code1; }
4
5
6
7
8 Typef f(...){ code2;
9 g(Argsg);
10 code3; }
→
1 Typeg g_swd(...){
2 k1=Nondet(); ... kN=Nondet();
3 Typeg ret = Nondet();
4 int post; Spec2Code(P, post);
5 fassume(post); return ret;
6 } //respects contract of g
7 Typeg g(...){ code1; }
8 Typef f(...){ code2;
9 g_swd(Argsg);
10 code3; }
Fig. 3: (a) A contract c ∈ C of callee g in f , vs. (b) its
translation for SWD
false value of each annotation, PATHCRAWLER will try to
cover at least one path where the annotation does not hold.
(An optimization in PATHCRAWLER avoids covering the same
fassert failure several times.) The NCD step may have three
outcomes. It returns (nc,V , a) if an NCCE V has been found
indicating the failing annotation a and recording the program
path piV activated by V on PNC. Second, if it has managed to
perform a complete exploration of all program paths without
finding an NCCE, it returns no (cf. the discussion of com-
pleteness in the end of Sec. II). Otherwise, if only a partial
exploration of program paths has been performed (due to a
timeout, partial coverage criterion or any other limitation), it
returns ? (unknown).
B. Subcontract Weakness and Prover Incapacity
To introduce the new categories of proof failures, we follow
the modular verification approach and need a few definitions.
A non-imbricated loop (resp. function, assertion) in f is a loop
(resp. function called, assertion) in f outside any loop in f . A
subcontract for f is the contract of some non-imbricated loop
or function in f . A non-imbricated annotation in f is either a
non-imbricated assertion or an annotation in a subcontract for
f . For instance, the function f of Fig. 2 has two subcontracts:
the contract of the called function g and the contract of the
loop on lines 33–37. The contract of the loop in g on lines
15–19 is not a subcontract for f , but is a subcontract for g.
We focus on non-imbricated annotations in f and assume
that all subcontracts for f are respected: the called functions in
f respect their contracts, and the loops in f preserve their loop
invariants and respect all imbricated annotations. Let cf denote
the contract of f , C the set of non-imbricated subcontracts for
f , and A the set of all non-imbricated annotations in f and the
annotations of cf . In other words, A contains the annotations
included in the contracts C ∪ {cf} as well as non-imbricated
assertions in f . We also assume that any subcontract of
f contains a (loop) assigns clause. This assumption is not
restrictive since such a clause is anyway necessary for the
proof of any nontrivial code.
Subcontract weakness. To apply testing for the contracts
of called functions and loops in C instead of their code, we
use a program transformation of P producing a new program
PGSW. The code of all non-imbricated function calls and loops
in f is replaced by a new one as follows.
For the contract c ∈ C of a called function g in f , the
program transformation (illustrated by Fig. 3) generates a new
function g_swd with the same signature whose code simulates
any possible behavior respecting the postcondition in c, and
replaces all calls to g by a call to g_swd. First, g_swd allows
1 Typef f(...){ code1;
2 /*@ loop assigns x1,...,xN;
3 @ loop invariant I; */
4 while(b){ code2; }
5 code3; }
→
1 Typef f(...){ code1;
2 x1=Nondet(); ... xN=Nondet();
3 int inv1; Spec2Code(I, inv1);
4 fassume(inv1 && !b); //respects loop contract
5 code3; }
Fig. 4: (a) A contract c ∈ C of a loop in f , vs. (b) its translation for SWD
1 int x;
2 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+1; assigns x; */
3 void g1() { x=x+2; }
4 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+1; assigns x; */
5 void g2() { x=x+2; }
6 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+1; assigns x; */
7 void g3() { x=x+2; }
8 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+4; assigns x; */
9 void f() { g1(); g2(); g3(); }
(a) Absence of SWCEs for any single subcontract does not imply
absence of global SWCEs
1 int x;
2 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+1; assigns x; */
3 void g1() { x=x+1; }
4 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+1; assigns x; */
5 void g2() { x=x+1; }
6 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+1; assigns x; */
7 void g3() { x=x+2; }
8 /*@ ensures x ≥ \old(x)+4; assigns x; */
9 void f() { g1(); g2(); g3(); }
(b) Global SWCEs do not help to find precisely a too weak subcontract
Fig. 5: Two examples with several subcontracts
any of the variables (or, more generally, left-values) present in
the assigns clause of c to change its value (line 2 in Fig.3(b)).
It can be realized by assigning a non-deterministic value of the
appropriate type using a dedicated function, denoted here by
Nondet() (or simply by adding an array of fresh input variables
and reading a different value for each use and each function
invocation). If the return type of g is not void, another non-
deterministic value is read for the returned value ret (line 3 in
Fig.3(b)). Finally, the validity of the postcondition is evaluated
(taking into account these new non-deterministic values) and
assumed in order to consider only executions that respect the
postcondition, and the function returns (lines 4–5 in Fig.3(b)).
Similarly, for the contract c ∈ C of a loop in f , the program
transformation replaces the code of the loop by another code
that simulates any possible behavior respecting c, that is,
ensuring the “loop postcondition” I ∧ ¬b after the loop as
shown in Fig. 4. In addition, the transformation treats in the
same way as in PNC all other annotations in A: preconditions
of called functions, initial loop invariant verifications and the
pre- and postcondition of f (they are not shown in Fig. 3(b)
and 4(b)).
Definition 2 (Global subcontract weakness): We say that
P has a global subcontract weakness for f if there exists a test
datum V for f respecting its precondition, such that PNC does
not report any annotation failure on V , while PGSW reports
an annotation failure on V . In this case, we say that V is a
global subcontract weakness counter-example (GSWCE) for
the set of subcontracts C.
Notice that we do not consider the same counter-example
as an NCCE and an SWCE. Indeed, even if some counter-
examples may illustrate both a subcontract weakness and a
non-compliance, we consider that non-compliances usually
come from a direct conflict between the code and the specifica-
tion and should be addressed first, while contract weaknesses
are often more subtle and will be easier to address when non-
compliances are eliminated.
Again, test generation can be applied on PGSW to generate
GSWCE candidates. When it finds a test datum V such that
PGSW fails on V , we use runtime assertion checking: if PNC
fails on V , then V is classified as an NCCE, otherwise V is a
GSWCE. We call this technique Global Subcontract Weakness
Detection for the set of all subcontracts, denoted GSWD. The
GSWD step may have four outcomes. It returns (nc,V , a) if
an NCCE V has been found for the failing annotation a, and
(sw,V , a,C) if V has been finally classified as an SWCE
indicating the failing annotation a and the set of subcontracts
C. The program path piV activated by V and leading to the
failure (on PNC or PGSW) is recorded as well. If the GSWD
has managed to perform a complete exploration of all program
paths without finding an GSWCE, it returns no. Otherwise, if
only a partial exploration of program paths has been performed
it returns ? (unknown).
A GSWCE indicates a global subcontract weakness but
does not explicitly identify which single subcontract c ∈ C
is too weak. To do that, we propose another program trans-
formation of P into an instrumented program P SSWc . It is
realized by replacing only one non-imbricated function call or
loop by the code respecting the postcondition of corresponding
subcontract c (as indicated in Fig. 3 and 4) and transforming
other annotations in A as in PNC.
Definition 3 (Single subcontract weakness): Let c be a
subcontract for f . We say that c is a too weak subcontract (or
has a single subcontract weakness) for f if there exists a test
datum V for f respecting its precondition, such that PNC does
not report any annotation failure on V , while P SSWc reports
an annotation failure on V . In this case, we say that V is
a single subcontract weakness counter-example (SSWCE) for
the subcontract c in f .
For any subcontract c ∈ C, test generation can be separately
applied on P SSWc to generate SSWCE candidates. If such a
test datum V is generated, it is checked on PNC to classify it
as an NCCE or an SSWCE. We call this technique, applied
for all subcontracts one after another until a first counter-
example V is found, Single Contract Weakness Detection,
denoted SSWD. The SSWD step may have three outcomes.
It returns (nc,V , a) if an NCCE V has been found for a
failing annotation a, and (sw,V , a, {c}) if V has been finally
classified as an SSWCE indicating the failing annotation a
and the single too weak subcontract c. The program path piV
activated by V and leading to the failure (on PNC or P SSWc )
is recorded as well. Otherwise, it returns ? (unknown), since
even after an exhaustive path testing the absence of SSWCE
for any individual subcontract c does not imply the absence of
P NCD(P )
1 V is NCCE
(nc, V , a)
SWD(P )
no / ? NCD(P ) = no ∧
SWD(P ) = no
no / ?
3 Prover incapacity
true
4 Unknown
false
2 V is SWCE
(sw, V , a, S)(nc, V
, a)
Fig. 6: Combined verification methodology in case of a proof failure on P
a GSWCE.
Indeed, sometimes SSWD cannot exhibit a subcontract
weakness for a single subcontract while there is a global
subcontract weakness for all of them at once. For example
in Fig. 5a, if we apply SSWD to any of the subcontracts, we
always have x ≥\old(x)+5 at the end of f (we add 1 to x
by executing the translated subcontract, and add 2 twice by
executing the other two functions’ code), so the postcondition
of f holds and no weakness is detected. If we run GSWD to
consider all subcontracts at once, we only get x≥\old(x)+3 after
executing the three subcontracts, and can exhibit a counter-
example.
On the other hand, running GSWD produces a GSWCE
that does not indicate which one of the subcontracts is too
weak, while SSWD can sometimes be more precise. For
Fig. 5b, since the three callees are replaced by their sub-
contracts for GSWD, it is impossible to find out which
one is too weak. Counter-examples generated by a prover
suffer from the same precision issue: taking into account all
subcontracts instead of the corresponding code prevents from
a precise identification of a single too week subcontract. In
this example we can be more precise with SSWD, since only
the replacement of the subcontract of g3 also leads to an
SSWCE: we can have x ≥\old(x)+3 by executing g1, g2 and the
subcontract of g3, exhibiting the contract weakness of g3. Thus,
the proposed SSWD technique can provide the verification
engineer with a more precise diagnostic than counter-examples
extracted from a prover.
We define a combined subcontract weakness detection
technique, denoted SWD, applying first SSWD followed by
GSWD until the first SWCE is found. SWD may have the
same four outcomes as SSWD. It allows us to be both precise
(and indicate when possible a single subcontract being too
weak), and complete (capable to find GSWCEs even when
there are no single subcontract weaknesses).
Prover incapacity. When neither a non-compliance nor a
global subcontract weakness exist, we cannot demonstrate that
it is impossible to prove the property.
Definition 4 (Prover incapacity): We say that a proof fail-
ure in P is due to a prover incapacity if for any test datum
V for f respecting its precondition, neither PNC nor PGSW
report any annotation failure on V . In other words, there is no
NCCE and no GSWCE for P .
V. DIAGNOSIS OF PROOF FAILURES USING STRUCTURAL
TESTING
In this section, we present an overview of our method for
diagnosis of proof failures using the detection techniques of
Sec. IV, and illustrate it on several examples. We also provide a
comprehensive list of suggestions of actions for each category
of proof failures.
The method. The proposed method is illustrated by Fig. 6.
Suppose that the proof of the annotated program P fails for
some non-imbricated annotation a ∈ A. The first step tries to
find a non-compliance using NCD. If such a non-compliance
is found, it generates an NCCE (marked by 1 in Fig. 6) and
classifies the proof failure as a non-compliance. If the first step
cannot generate a counter-example, the SWD step combines
SSWD and GSWD and tries to generate single SWCEs, then
global SWCEs, until the first counter-example is generated
and classified (either as an NCCE 1 or an SWCE 2 ).
If no counter-example has been found, the last step checks
the outcomes. If both NCD and SWD have returned no,
that is, both NCD and GSWD have performed a complete
path exploration without finding a counter-example, the proof
failure is classified as a prover incapacity 3 (cf. Def. 4).
Otherwise, it remains unclassified 4 . Fig. 7 associates a
variant of the illustrating example to each case. For each case,
we detail the lines we modified in the program of Fig. 2 to
obtain a new program, the intermediate results of deductive
verification, NCD and SWD and the final verdict (including
the generated counter-example if any).
The proof failure category and the counter-example V ,
along with the recorded path piV , the reported failing anno-
tation a and set of too weak subcontracts S, can be extremely
helpful for the verification engineer. Suppose we try to prove
in WP a modified version of the function f of Fig. 2 where
the precondition at line 24 is missing. The proof of the
precondition of g on line 10 for the call on line 41 fails without
indicating a precise reason. The NCD step of STADY generates
an NCCE (case 1 , #1 in Fig. 7) where is_rgf(a,n) is clearly
false due to a[0] being non-zero, and indicates the failing
annotation (coming from line 10). That helps the verification
engineer to understand and fix the issue.
Let us suppose now that the clause on line 34 has been er-
roneously written as follows: loop assigns i, a[1..n-1];. The
loop on lines 36–37 still preserves its invariant. The NCD step
does not find any NCCE, as this modification did not introduce
any non-compliance between the code and its specification.
Thanks to the replacement shown in Fig. 4, SSWD for the
contract of this loop will detect a single subcontract weakness
for the loop contract (case 2 , #2 in Fig. 7), and report a fail
to establish the precondition of g (on line 10) for the call on
line 41. With the indication of the single subcontract weakness
for the loop, the verification engineer will try to strengthen the
loop contract and find the issue.
Suppose now we want to prove the absence of overflow
at line 40 of Fig. 2, but the lemma on lines 4–5 (that allows
the prover to deduce this property) is missing. The proof fails
without giving a precise reason since the prover does not
perform the induction needed to deduce the right bounds on
a[i]. Neither NCD nor SWD can produce a counter-example,
and as the initial program has too many paths, their outcomes
# Impacted lines Intermediate outcome Final outcomeLine Changes Proof (failing annot.) NCD SWD
0 – – ✓ – – Proved
1 24 (deleted) ? (l.39, 41, 26) nc – V = 〈n=1; a[0]=-214739〉 is NCCE
2 34 loop assigns i,a[1..n-1];
? (l.39, 41, 42, 26–30) ? sw for l.33–34
V = 〈 n=2;a[0]=0;a[1]=0;
nondeta[1]=97157;
nondeti=0 〉 is SWCE
3 4–5 (deleted) ? (l.39) no no Prover incapacity22 requires n>0 && n<21;
4 4–5 (deleted) ? (l.39) ? ? Unknown
Fig. 7: Method results for different versions of the illustrating example.
are ? (unknown) (case 4 , #4 in Fig. 7). For such situations,
STADY offers the possibility to reduce the input domain. The
verification engineer can add the ACSL clause typically n<5;
to reduce the array size for testing (this clause is ignored by the
proof). Running STADY now allows the tool to complete the
exploration of all program paths (for n<5) both for NCD and
SWD without finding a counter-example. STADY classifies
the proof failure for the program with the reduced domain
as a prover incapacity (case 3 , #3 in Fig. 7). That gives the
verification engineer more confidence that the proof failure has
the same reason on the initial program for bigger sizes n.
The verification engineer prefers to try interactive proof or
adding additional lemmas or assertions, and does not waste
time looking for a bug or a too week subcontract.
Suggestions of actions. From the possible outcomes of
the method illustrated in Fig. 6 we are able to suggest to
the verification engineer the most suitable actions (displayed
in Fig. 8) to help her with the verification task. A non-
compliance of the code w.r.t. annotation a means that there
is an inconsistency between the precondition, the annotation
a and the code of the path piV leading to a. Thanks to the
counter-example, the values of variables at different program
points along piV can be either traced or explored in a debugger
[13]. In FRAMA-C, the execution on V can be conveniently
explored using VALUE or PATHCRAWLER. This helps the
verification engineer to understand the issue. Indeed, if an
NCCE is generated, there is no need to try automatic proof or
look for a too weak subcontract — it will not help. The reason
of the proof failure is necessarily related to a non-compliance
between the code and annotations traversed by the path piV .
A weakness of a set of subcontracts S means that at least
one of the contracts of C has to be strengthened. By Definitions
2 and 3, the non-compliance is excluded here, that is, the
execution of PNC on V respects the annotation a, thus the
suggested action is to strengthen the subcontract(s). In the
case of single subcontract weakness, S is a singleton so the
suggestion is very precise and helpful to the user. Again, trying
interactive proof or additional assertions or lemmas will be
useless here since the property can obviously not be proved
because of the counter-example. For a prover incapacity, the
verification engineer may write lemmas or assertions, add
hypotheses that may help the theorem prover to succeed or
try another theorem prover. She also may want to use a
proof assistant like COQ, so that she does not suffer from
the limitations of the theorem provers, but this task can be
more complex and time-consuming. Finally, when the verdict
is unknown, test generation for NCD and/or SWD times out,
so the verification engineer may strengthen the precondition
for testing to reduce the input domain, or extend the timeout
to give STADY more time to conclude.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
Implementation. The proposed method for diagnosis of
proof failures has been implemented as a FRAMA-C plugin,
named STADY. It relies on other plugins: WP [6] for de-
ductive verification and PATHCRAWLER [10] for structural
test generation. STADY currently supports a significant subset
of the E-ACSL specification language, including requires,
ensures, behavior, assumes, loop invariant, loop variant and
assert clauses. Quantified predicates \exists and \forall and
builtin terms as \sum or \numof are translated as loops. Logic
functions and named predicates are treated by inlining. The
\old constructs are treated by saving the initial values of
formal parameters and global variables at the beginning of the
function. Validity checks of pointers are partially supported
due to the current limitation of the underlying test generator:
we can only check the validity of input pointers and global
arrays. The assigns clauses are only taken into consideration
during the SWD phase: we do not aim to find what is missing
in the assigns clause (NCD) because provers usually give
sufficiently good feedback about it, but we want to find what
is unnecessary and could be removed from an assigns clause
(SWD). Inductive predicates, recursive functions and floating-
point numbers are currently not supported and are part of our
future work.
The research questions we address in our experiments are
the following.
RQ1 Is STADY able to precisely diagnose most proof
failures in C programs?
RQ2 What are the benefits of the SWD extension (in
particular, with respect to NCD)?
RQ3 Is STADY able to generate NCCEs or SWCEs even
with a partial testing coverage?
RQ4 Is STADY’s execution time comparable to the time of
an automatic proof?
Experimental protocol. The evaluation used 20 annotated
programs from [14], whose size varies from 35 to 100 lines of
annotated C code. These programs manipulate arrays, they are
fully specified in ACSL and their specification expresses non-
trivial properties of C arrays. To evaluate the method presented
in Sec. V and its implementation, we apply STADY on sys-
tematically generated altered versions (or mutants) of correct
C programs. Each mutant program is obtained by performing
a single modification (or mutation) on the initial program. The
mutations include: a binary operator modification in the code
Case Verdict Suggestions
1 Non-compliance w.r.t. the annotation a:
(nc, V , a)
check the violated annotation a or the code leading to
a in the path piV , or strengthen the precondition of the
function under verification
2 Weakness of subcontracts in S w.r.t. the
annotation a: (sw, V , a, S)
strengthen one or several subcontracts in S to exclude
the subcontract weakness
3 Prover incapacity add lemmas or assertions to help the theorem prover,
or use another prover, or an interactive proof assistant
4 Unknown strengthen the typically clause or coverage criterion
(e.g. k-path), or increase the timeout limit for testing
Fig. 8: Suggestions of actions for different categories of proof failures
or in the specification, a condition negation in the code, a
relation modification in the specification, a predicate negation
in the specification, a partial loop invariant or postcondition
deletion in the specification. In this study, we do not mutate
the precondition of the function under verification, and restrict
possible mutations on binary operators to avoid creating absurd
expressions, in particular for pointer arithmetics.
The first step tries to prove each mutant using WP. The
proved mutants respect the specification and are classified as
correct. Second, we apply the NCD method on the remaining
mutants. It classifies proof failures for some mutants as non-
compliances, indicates the failing annotation and an NCCE.
The third step applies the SWD method on remaining mutants,
classifies some of them as subcontract weaknesses, indicates
the weak subcontract and a SWCE. If no counter-example
has been found by the SWD, the mutant remains unclassified.
The results are displayed in Fig. 9. The columns present the
number of generated mutants, and the results of each of the
three steps: the number (#) and ratio (%) of classified mutants,
maximal and average execution time (put on two lines) of
the step over classified mutants (t✓ or t✗) and over non-
classified mutants (t?) at this step. The ratios are computed
with respect to unclassified mutants after the previous step. The
NCD+SWD columns sum up selected results after both NCD
and SWD steps: the average and maximal time (t) are shown
globally over all mutants. The time is computed until the proof
is finished or until the first counter-example is generated. The
final number of remaining unclassified mutants (#?) is given
in the last column.
Experimental results. For the 20 considered programs,
928 mutants have been generated. 80 of them have been
proved by WP. Among the 848 unproven mutants, NCD has
detected a non-compliance induced by the mutation in 776
mutants (91.5%), leaving 72 unclassified. Among them, SWD
has been able to exhibit a counter-example (either a NCCE or
a SWCE) for 48 of them (66.7%), finally leaving 24 programs
unclassified. They can be either equivalent mutants that were
not proved by WP due to a prover incapacity, or mutants
coming from a mutation in an unsupported annotation being
undetectable by the current version, or incorrect mutants for
which testing was incomplete due to a timeout. Regarding
RQ1, STADY has found a precise reason of the proof failures
and produced a counter-example in 824 of the 848 unproven
mutants, i.e. classifying 97.2%. Exploring the benefits of
detecting a prover incapacity may often require to manually
reduce the input domain, to try additional lemmas or interactive
proof, so it was not sufficiently investigated in this study (and
would probably require another, non mutational approach).
Regarding RQ2, NCD alone diagnosed 776 of 848 un-
proven mutants (91.5%). SWD diagnosed 48 of the 72 re-
maining mutants (66.7%) bringing a significant complementary
contribution to a better understanding of reasons of many proof
failures.
In our experiments, each prover can try to prove each
verification condition during at most 40 seconds. We also
set a timeout for any test generation session to 5 seconds,
i.e. one session for the NCD step, and several sessions for
SWD steps. We also limit the depth of explored program
paths with the k-path criterion (cf. Sec. II) setting k = 4.
Both the session timeout and the k-path heavily limit the
testing coverage but STADY still detects 97.2% of faults in
the generated programs. That addresses RQ3 and demonstrates
that the proposed method can efficiently classify proof failures
and generate counter-examples even with a partial testing
coverage and can therefore be used for programs where the
total number of paths cannot be limited (e.g. by the typically
clause).
Concerning RQ4, on the considered programs WP needs
on average 2.6 sec. per mutant (at most 4.4 sec.) to prove a
program, and spends 13.0 sec. on average (at most 61.3 sec.)
when the proof fails. The total execution time of STADY is
comparable: it needs on average 2.7 sec. per unproven mutant
(at most 19.9 sec.).
Summary. The experiments show that the proposed
method can automatically classify a significant number of
proof failures within an analysis time comparable to the time of
an automatic proof and for programs for which only a partial
testing coverage is possible. The SWD technique offers an
efficient complement to NCD for a more complete and more
precise diagnosis of proof failures.
Threats to validity. As it is often the case in software
verification studies, one major threat is related to the rep-
resentativeness of results, i.e. their external validity. In our
case, due to the nature of the problem, we are restricted to
realistic annotated programs that cannot be generated auto-
matically or extracted from existing databases of unspecified
code. Therefore, to reduce this threat, we used programs from
an independent benchmark [14] created in order to illustrate
on different examples the usage of the ACSL specification
language for deductive verification with FRAMA-C.
Proof NCD SWD NCD + SWD
Case study #mut #✓ t✓ t? #✗ % t✗ t? #✗ % t✗ t? % t #?
binary search 99 5 6 3.4 6 50.1 86 91.5 6 9.4 6 2.7 8 100.0 6 5.9 — 100.0 6 9.4 0
≈ 3.3 ≈ 19.9 ≈ 2.6 ≈ 2.6 ≈ 3.7 — ≈ 2.9
binary search2 99 5 6 3.3 6 50.4 86 91.5 6 5.4 6 2.6 8 100.0 6 6.4 — 100.0 6 9.0 0
≈ 3.3 ≈ 19.9 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 3.9 — ≈ 2.8
lower bound 52 1 6 2.5 6 49.4 46 90.2 6 5.1 6 2.4 5 100.0 6 2.3 — 100.0 6 5.1 0
≈ 2.4 ≈ 26.2 ≈ 2.3 ≈ 2.3 ≈ 2.2 — ≈ 2.5
upper bound 52 1 6 2.6 6 49.8 46 90.2 6 5.2 6 2.4 5 100.0 6 2.3 — 100.0 6 5.2 0
≈ 2.5 ≈ 26.7 ≈ 2.2 ≈ 2.3 ≈ 2.2 — ≈ 2.5
max element 52 5 6 3.6 6 20.5 41 87.2 6 5.3 6 2.5 3 50.0 6 2.6 6 4.8 93.6 6 7.3 3
≈ 2.9 ≈ 9.1 ≈ 2.8 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 4.7 ≈ 3.2
max element2 52 3 6 3.4 6 20.1 43 87.8 6 5.7 6 2.6 3 50.0 6 2.5 6 5.3 93.9 6 7.8 3
≈ 2.9 ≈ 8.9 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 5.0 ≈ 3.0
max seq 125 26 6 4.4 6 22.1 87 87.9 6 6.3 6 3.7 0 0.0 — 6 6.4 87.9 6 9.5 12
≈ 3.9 ≈ 9.4 ≈ 3.0 ≈ 3.1 — ≈ 6.1 ≈ 3.8
min element 52 3 6 3.4 6 16.3 43 87.8 6 5.3 6 2.9 3 50.0 6 2.8 6 5.8 93.9 6 8.4 3
≈ 3.0 ≈ 8.5 ≈ 2.6 ≈ 2.6 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 5.3 ≈ 3.1
copy 23 2 6 2.5 6 40.9 20 95.2 6 2.5 6 2.0 1 100.0 6 2.0 — 100.0 6 4.0 0
≈ 2.3 ≈ 12.6 ≈ 2.1 ≈ 2.0 ≈ 2.0 — ≈ 2.2
fill 23 2 6 1.9 6 8.5 20 95.2 6 1.9 6 2.5 1 100.0 6 1.9 — 100.0 6 4.4 0
≈ 1.9 ≈ 4.3 ≈ 1.9 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 1.9 — ≈ 2.0
iota 29 2 6 2.2 6 12.9 25 92.6 6 5.0 6 2.1 2 100.0 6 2.1 — 100.0 6 5.0 0
≈ 2.1 ≈ 7.8 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 2.0 ≈ 2.0 — ≈ 2.5
replace copy 25 2 6 3.2 6 61.3 21 91.3 6 5.5 6 2.8 2 100.0 6 2.5 — 100.0 6 5.5 0
≈ 3.2 ≈ 16.4 ≈ 3.2 ≈ 2.8 ≈ 2.4 — ≈ 3.4
reverse copy 27 2 6 2.0 6 41.2 24 96.0 6 2.1 6 2.0 1 100.0 6 1.9 — 100.0 6 4.0 0
≈ 1.9 ≈ 14.5 ≈ 2.1 ≈ 2.0 ≈ 1.9 — ≈ 2.1
adjacent find 32 4 6 2.8 6 57.4 26 92.9 6 5.3 6 8.3 1 50.0 6 2.4 6 11.6 96.4 6 19.9 1
≈ 2.5 ≈ 21.8 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 5.2 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 11.6 ≈ 3.1
equal 25 2 6 2.7 6 15.6 22 95.7 6 5.1 6 2.1 1 100.0 6 2.1 — 100.0 6 5.1 0
≈ 2.3 ≈ 9.9 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 2.1 ≈ 2.1 — ≈ 2.5
equal2 25 2 6 1.5 6 15.3 22 95.7 6 5.0 6 2.4 1 100.0 6 1.9 — 100.0 6 5.0 0
≈ 1.4 ≈ 9.3 ≈ 2.2 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 1.9 — ≈ 2.3
equal3 60 7 6 2.7 6 15.3 51 96.2 6 3.4 6 2.8 0 0.0 — 6 5.5 96.2 6 8.3 2
≈ 2.6 ≈ 9.3 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 2.6 — ≈ 5.3 ≈ 2.7
find 25 2 6 2.4 6 20.6 22 95.7 6 5.0 6 2.0 1 100.0 6 2.1 — 100.0 6 5.0 0
≈ 2.4 ≈ 8.8 ≈ 2.3 ≈ 2.0 ≈ 2.1 — ≈ 2.3
find2 26 2 6 2.9 6 15.6 23 95.8 6 5.0 6 2.4 1 100.0 6 2.1 — 100.0 6 5.0 0
≈ 2.4 ≈ 8.2 ≈ 2.2 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 2.1 — ≈ 2.3
mismatch 25 2 6 2.2 6 15.0 22 95.7 6 5.2 6 2.3 1 100.0 6 2.2 — 100.0 6 5.2 0
≈ 2.1 ≈ 9.3 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 2.3 ≈ 2.2 — ≈ 2.5
Total 928 80 776 91.5 48 66.7 97.2 24
Max 6 4.4 6 61.3 6 9.4 6 8.3 6 6.4 6 11.6 6 19.9
Mean ≈ 2.6 ≈ 13.0 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 2.5 ≈ 2.4 ≈ 6.3 ≈ 2.7
Fig. 9: Detailed experiments of proof failure diagnosis for mutants with STADY
Scalability of the results is another threat since we do not
demonstrate their validity for functions of larger programs.
Because of the modular reasoning of deductive verification,
it can be argued that the proposed technique should only be
applied on a unit level, separately for each function, since the
verification engineer proves a program in this way. Indeed,
in the current practice of deductive verification, it does not
make sense to analyze proof failures for the whole module or
application at the same time.
The main scalability concern is thus related to the usage
of structural test generation that can often time out without
achieving a full coverage. To address this issue, we have
specifically investigated the impact of a partial test coverage on
the effectiveness of the method (cf. RQ3 above) and proposed
a convenient way to reduce the input domain (using typically
clause, an extension of ACSL).
Other threats can be due to the used measurements, i.e.
construct validity. To reduce this threat, we used a careful
measurement of results (including analysis time for each step
and each mutant, their mean and maximal values, separately
computed for classified and unclassified proof failures). One
concern is producing realistic situations in which the ver-
ification engineer can need help in the analysis of proof
failures. While the first users of STADY have appreciated its
feedback, we have not yet had the opportunity to organize a fair
evaluation with a representative group of users. Thus we have
performed an extended set of experiments using simulation of
errors by mutations as an alternative in the meanwhile. We
have chosen a large subset of mutation operators (mutation in
the code, mutation in an annotation, deletion of an annotation)
that model frequent problematic situations (incorrect code or
annotations, incomplete specification) leading to proof failures.
This approach looks suitable for non-compliance and subcon-
tract weaknesses, and certainly less suitable for the more subtle
prover incapacity cases. The results should be later confirmed
by a representative user study.
VII. RELATED WORK
Understanding proof failures. A two-step verification
in [15] compares the proof failures of an Eiffel program with
those of its variant where called functions are inlined and loops
are unrolled. It reports code and contract revision suggestions
from this comparison. Inlining and unrolling are respectively
limited to a given number of nested calls and explicit iterations.
If that number is too small the semantics is lost and a warning
of unsoundness is also reported to the user.
Proof tree analysis. More precision can be statically
obtained by analyzing the unclosed branches of a proof tree.
The work [16] is performed in the context of KEY and its
verification calculus that applies deduction rules to a dynamic
formula mixing a program and its specification. It proposes
falsifiability preservation checking that helps to distinguish
whether the branch failure comes from a programming error or
from a contract weakness. However this technique can detect
bugs only if contracts are strong enough. Moreover it is auto-
matic only if a prover (typically, an SMT solver) can decide
the non-satisfiability of the first-order formula expressing the
falsifiability preservation condition. [17] exploits the proof
trees generated during a proof attempt by KEY. The relevance
of generated tests depends on the quality of the specification
written by the user, and it does not allow to distinguish non-
compliances from specification weaknesses.
Combination of static and dynamic analysis. Static
and dynamic analysis work better when used together, as in
the method SYNERGY [18], its interprocedural and compo-
sitional extension in SMASH [19], the method SANTE [20]
and the present method. Static analysis maintains an over-
approximation that aims at verifying the correctness of the sys-
tem, while dynamic analysis maintains an under-approximation
trying to detect an error. Both abstractions help each other
in a way similar to the counter-example guided abstraction
refinement method (CEGAR) [21].
Counter-examples for non-inductive invariants.
Counter-examples can be generated to show that invariants
proposed for transition systems are too strong or too
weak [22]. Differences with our work are the focus on
invariants, the formalism of transition systems, and the use of
random testing (with QUICKCHECK).
Other verification feedbacks. Our goal was to find input
data to illustrate proof failures. A complementary work [13]
proposed to extend a runtime assertion checker to use it as
a debugger to help the user understand complex proof failure
counter-examples. The DAFNY development environment [3]
provides verification feedback to the user during the program-
ming phase. It integrates the BOOGIE Verification Debugger
[23] that helps the understanding of verification tools like
BOOGIE. Currently, DAFNY only uses counter-examples pro-
vided by the solver, and does not produce as much information
when verification times out as it does when verification fails.
Checking prover assumptions. Axioms are logic prop-
erties used as hypotheses by provers and thus usually not
checked. Model-based testing applied to a computational
model of an axiom permits to detect errors in axioms and
thus to maintain the soundness of the axiomatization [24]. This
work is complementary to ours because it tackles the case of
deductive verification trivially succeeding due to an invalid
axiomatization, whereas we tackle the case of inconclusive
deductive verification. [25] proposed to complete the results
of static checkers with dynamic symbolic execution using
PEX. The explicit assumptions used by the verifier (absence
of overflows, non-aliasing, etc.) create new branches in the
program’s control flow graph which PEX tries to explore.
This approach permits to detect errors out of the scope of
the considered static checkers, but does not provide counter-
examples in case of a specification weakness.
The present work continues the previous efforts to facili-
tate deductive verification by generating counter-examples. We
propose an original detection technique of three categories of
proof failure that gives a more precise diagnostic than in the
previous work using testing. Thanks to the separate detection
of non-compliances and single subcontract weaknesses, the
generated counter-examples can better identify the reasons of
proof failures than those extracted from a solver. To the best
of our knowledge, such a complete testing-based methodology
proposed in this paper, automatically providing to the verifi-
cation engineer a precise feedback on proof failures was not
studied, implemented and evaluated before.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a new approach to improve the user feedback
in case of a proof failure. Our method relies on test generation
and helps to decide whether the proof has failed or timed out
due to a non-compliance between the code and the specifi-
cation, a subcontract weakness, or a prover weakness. This
approach is based on a spec-to-code program transformation
that allows to use a test generator taking a C program as input.
The transformation for SWD is an original contribution of this
paper. Our experiments show that our implementation – as a
FRAMA-C plugin, STADY– was able to diagnose over 97% of
the programs (generated by introducing a mutation in a verified
program).
One benefit of the proposed approach is the capacity to
provide the verification engineer with a precise reason of a
proof failure that helps to choose the right way to proceed and
facilitates the processing of proof failures. Counter-examples
illustrate the issue on concrete values and help to find out
more easily why the proof fails. The method is completely
automatic, relies on the existing specification and does not
require any additional manual specification or instrumentation
task. As a consequence, this method can be adopted by less
experienced verification engineers and software developers.
One requirement of the complete method coming from
test generation is to have the C code of called functions,
while the GSWD technique remains applicable even without
source code. Another limitation is related to a potentially
very big number of program path, that cannot be explored.
Initial experiments show that proof failures can be classified in
practice even after test generation with a partial test coverage,
within a testing time comparable to the time of the proof.
We are convinced that the proposed methodology facilitates
the verification task by lowering the level of expertise required
to conduct a deductive program proof, removing one of the
major obstacles for a wider use of deductive verification in in-
dustry. Future work includes further evaluation of the proposed
methodology, a study of optimized combinations of NCD and
SWD for subsets of annotations and subcontracts, experiments
on a larger class of programs and a better support of E-ACSL
constructs in our implementation (inductive predicates, validity
of non-input pointers).
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1 /*@ requires P1;
2 ensures P2; */
3 Typeg g(...) {
4 code1;
5 }
6 /*@ requires P5;
7 ensures P6; */
8 Typef f(...) {
9 code2;
10 g(...);
11 //@ loop invariant P3;
12 while(b) {
13 code3;
14 }
15 code4;
16 //@ assert P4;
17 code5;
18 }
→
1 Typeg g(...) {
2 int pre_g; Spec2Code(P1, pre_g);
3 fassert(pre_g);
4 code1;
5 int post_g; Spec2Code(P2,post_g);
6 fassert(post_g);
7 }
8 Typef f(...) {
9 int pre_f; Spec2Code(P5, pre_f);
10 fassume(pre_f);
11 code2;
12 g(...);
13 int inv1; Spec2Code(P3, inv1);
14 fassert(inv1);
15 while(b) {
16 code3;
17 int inv2; Spec2Code(P3, inv2);
18 fassert(inv2);
19 }
20 code4;
21 int asrt; Spec2Code(P4, asrt);
22 fassert(asrt);
23 code5;
24 int post_f; Spec2Code(P6,post_f);
25 fassert(post_f);
26 }
Fig. 10: (a) An annotated code, vs. (b) its translation for NCD
APPENDIX
Program transformation for non-compliance detection.
Fig. 10 illustrates the translation of an annotated program P
into another C program, PNC, that is used to generate counter-
examples during non-compliance detection (NCD).
